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ARTICLES
DEBALKANIZE THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKETPLACEt
NICHOLAS W. ALLARD* and THERESA LAUERHASS**
ABSTRACr
This article analyzes the technology-specific regulatory environment of the United
States subscription television marketplace. The article examines the need for a
more rational technology-neutral implementation of telecommunications policies in
order to enhance innovation, full utilization of advanced technologies, and U.S.
competitiveness. In tracing the origins of today's checkerboard regulatory
framework, including the evolution of laws and regulations which currently apply
to cable television and alternative multichannel delivery systems such as the
telephone companies, wireless cable, SMATV, TVRO, and DBS, the article finds
that the resulting compartmentalization of individual technologies has been caused
by historic accident rather than driven by any underlying policy objectives. The
article documents a consistent pattern of underutilization of new technologies, with
development and delivery to consumers of the full benefits of innovations
repeatedly slowed by regulatory impediments rather than by any lack of commer-
cial viability. In particular, the article highlights the debates surrounding telco
entry, inter-industry cross-ownership restrictions, the cable compulsory license and
a variety of other telecommunications issues to illustrate how incidental regulatory
distinctions among technologies have impaired the growth and competitiveness of
the U.S. telecommunications marketplace. In the authors' view, regulatory
distinctions among industries and rules that restrict the use or the combination of
different technologies are not appropriate unless there is a compelling policy reason
to distinguish among the technologies. The authors do not argue for deregulation
of telecommunications, but rather for regulation better designed to serve public
policy. The article concludes that telecommunications laws, regulations and
policies should, to the extent possible, be technology-neutral. Congress and
regulators should pursue technology-neutral policies and resist pursuing policy goals
on an ad hoe, technology-specific basis. Only by debalkanizing the telecom-
munications market from unnecessary technology-specific legal barriers will all
U.S. telecommunications industries realize their full potential.
INTRODUCTION
In the United States, the telecommunications marketplace remains a
t The views expressed in the article are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily
represent those of their firm or their clients. The authors would like to thank Michael H. Glass
for his research assistance and Paul Sinderbrand for his insights and generous contribution to our
understanding of the subject matter.
* Partner, Fox, Bennett & Turner, Washington, D.C.; B.A., 1974, Princeton University;
B.A., 1976, Oxford University; J.D., 1979 Yale University. Mr. Allard's regulatory and
legislative practice includes representation of the Wireless Cable Association and other
communications clients.
** B.A., 1987, Duke University; J.D., 1992, George Washington University, National Law
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Monopolies, and Business Rights Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary and will
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checkerboard pattern of distinct industries reminiscent of a pre-World War
I map of Europe. The various radio, telephone, and television video delivery
systems, for example, are divided into separate industries by statutory,
regulatory, and judicial boundaries rather than by technological or business
realities. The technology-specific legal environment of established industries
can also create an array of protective barriers that are unfavorable to new
commercial applications of advanced technologies. This combination of
compartmentalized and protective telecommunications law is unable to
anticipate and keep pace with the inevitability of rapid technological change,
stunts the growth and efficiency of U.S. telecommunications businesses and
hinders their international competitiveness. Recognizing the inhospitality of
the legal terrain, there are significant efforts underway in Congress1 and at
1. See, e.g., H.R. 550, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (would prohibit local cable companies
from unreasonably discriminating among their subscribers and prohibit programming distributors
that are affiliated with cable operators from unreasonably refusing to deal with other multichan-
nel distributors of cable and from imposing other terms on their programming that would impede
retail competition); H.R. 1303, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (would facilitate access to
programming for multichannel video providers by barring national and regional programmers
affiliated with cable operators from unreasonably refusing to deal with distributors in prices,
terms, and conditions of programming, provide for cable rate regulation in absence of effective
competition, etc.); H.R. 2546, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (would promote the development
of a nationwide broadband telecommunications infrastructure by 2015 and permit increased
telephone company entry into the video marketplace subject to certain safeguards) [hereinafter
H.R. 2546]; H.R. 3420, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (would require programmers to establish
nondiscriminatory prices, terms, and conditions for distribution of their programming through
third-party packagers, require satellite television programmers who encrypt their services to
make those services available to home satellite antenna users, and require programmers to
establish reasonable and nondiscriminatory criteria for licensing satellite distributors); H.R.
3560, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (would provide for fair access to programming, encourage
multiple franchises, protect against horizontal concentration and vertical integration, provide for
rate regulation, etc.); H.R. 3701, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (would encourage the
development of a national fiber optic network by creating a special fund, financed by requiring
the FCC to use competitive bidding in awarding telecommunications licenses rather than
awarding by lottery); H.R. 4451, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (would clarify Congress' intent
to provide a technology neutral cable compulsory license); H.R. 4511, 102d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1992) (would reform the cable and satellite compulsory license systems); S. 12, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1991) (would bar national and regional programmers affiliated with cable operators
from unreasonably refusing to deal with distributors in prices, terms, and conditions of
programming; provide for cable rate regulation in absence of effective competition; etc.)
[hereinafter S. 12]; S. 211, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991) (would prohibit local cable companies
from unreasonably discriminating among their subscribers, and prohibit programming distrib-
utors affiliated with cable operators from unreasonably refusing to deal with other multichannel
distributors of cable or from charging prices or imposing other terms of their programming that
would impede retail competition); S. 218, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (would require the
Secretary of Commerce to make additional frequencies available for commercial assignment in
order to promote the development and use of new telecommunications technologies, and for
other purposes, and would reinstate the fairness doctrine); S. 431, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991)
(would provide that basic cable rates can be regulated in the absence of effective comptrition,
which would be defined as the presence of more than one multichannel video programming
distributor in a particular cable franchise area, and would prevent cable operators who offer
multiple tiers of basic service from forcing consumers to buy channels which they do not want
in order to receive those programming services which they do want); S. 432, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1991) (would require vertically integrated cable programmers to offer their programming
to alternative technologies on fair terms and at nondiscriminatory prices and restrict horizontal
concentration in the cable industry by forbidding any one cable company from providing service
to more than twenty-five percent of cable subscribers in the country); S. 1200, 102d Cong., 1st
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the FCC2 to modify existing telecommunications rules to improve the legal
landscape.
U.S. business' inability to take full advantage of recent advances in
television technology vividly demonstrates how commercial opportunities are
determined and limited by anachronistic, technology-specific laws.
Historically, broadcast television was seen as the dominant force in the video
marketplace. In 1975, the United States had no cable networks, since cable
was used solely as a broadcast retransmission medium, and, in 1976, only
seventeen percent of television households subscribed to cable.3 In a very
short time, however, the video marketplace changed dramatically. The
broadcast industry began facing increasingly intense challenges from a
powerful cable television industry. By 1990, the prime time viewing share
of the three major commercial networks had fallen to sixty-four percent from
a ninety-three percent share in 1975.' Today, cable television is accessible
in over ninety percent of television households.5 In addition, new commer-
cial delivery systems, including "wireless cable," 6 SMATV ("private
cable"), 7 and the TVRO ("home satellite dish") industry' now provide
Sess. (1991) (would promote the establishment of a nationwide broadband communications
system and permit local telephone companies to provide video programming, subject to certain
safeguards) [hereinafter S. 1200]; But see, e.g., H.R. 3513, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991)
(would restrict regional operating companies in offering information services); S. 2112, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (would restrict regional operating companies from offering information
services) [hereinafter S. 2112].
2. Presently, the FCC is considering amending a number of current regulations which place
restrictions on broadcasters, the telephone companies, cable television, and wireless cable, as
well as other subscription television technologies. For example, the FCC has recommended
easing restrictions on telephone company entry into the video marketplace, 56 Fed. Reg. 65,464
(1991), and eliminating certain restrictions on network-cable cross-ownership, 57 Fed. Reg.
6792 (1992).
3. FLORENCE SETZER & JONATHAN LEVY, OFFICE OF PLANS AND POICY, FCC,
BROADCAST TELEVISION IN A MULTICHANNEL MARKETPLACE, OPP WORKING PAPER No. 26,
at vii (1991) [hereinafter BROADCAST TELEVISION IN A MULTICHANNEL MARKETPLACE].
4. Id. at viii.
5. Id. "[C]able subscribership [grew] from 17 percent of households in 1976 to 56 percent
in 1990." Id. at 11.
6. "Wireless cable" systems use the Super High Frequency (SHF) portion of the radio
frequency spectrum to transmit multiple channels of video programming from terrestrial
transmitters to small antennas mounted on subscribers' rooftops. Wireless cable is now able to
provide multichannel programming using a combination of the following services: multipoint
distribution service (MDS), multichannel multipoint distribution service (MMDS), instructional
fixed television services (ITFS), and the former operational fixed service (OFS). The OFS
channels have been reallocated to MDS, effective January 2, 1992. 56 Fed. Reg. 57,808
(1991). Through its combination of services, wireless cable can now provide up to thirty-three
channels.
7. Satellite Master Antenna Television (SMATV), otherwise known as "private cable,"
serves private, multi-unit dwellings. A SMATV system connects a master antenna television
system (MATV), which links the units in the dwelling to a single external television antenna,
and a receive-only satellite earth station (TVRO).
8. Television receive-only satellite earth stations, otherwise known as home satellite dishes,
or backyard dishes, are used to receive satellite delivered programming. These dishes "access
primarily C-Band satellite transponders and in some instances access Ku-Band transponders."
S. Rep. No. 92, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1991). C-Band antennas are usually approximately
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subscription television services to a small but growing number of users. On
the horizon, emerging technologies such as direct broadcast satellite (DBS),
fiber optics, digital transmission, channel compression, and high-definition
television (HDTV), as well as the increased involvement of telephone
companies promise to further alter the video marketplace.
If, in this time of rapid technological change, the United States wishes
to promote an internationally competitive telecommunications industry, it
cannot afford to maintain rigid, static laws that protect established technolo-
gies at the expense of innovative and potentially competitive technologies.
Instead, to allow the realities of the marketplace to control the industry and
spur competition, the United States should adhere to telecommunications
policies and general principles which are technology-neutral.
This article will discuss the issue of technology-neutral regulation in the
context of the subscription television market. Of course, the analysis
supporting technology-neutrality in telecommunications policy is not limited
to that field. Ideally, telecommunications policy should be flexible enough
to encourage rather than discourage combinations of technologies and innova-
tions which are efficient and commercially promising.
I. CABLE TELEVISION COMES OF AGE
In large part, cable television owes its present dominance to the fact that
it became legally feasible much earlier than other potentially competing
delivery systems for subscription television. If cable had not obtained the
compulsory license to retransmit distant broadcast signals and if it had not
been given a big boost by Congress in the Cable Communications Policy Act
of 19849 (Cable Act of 1984) it could not have risen to its current position
of expanding dominance.' 0 The resulting statutory and regulatory environ-
ment favored cable-only systems as the exclusive distributor of subscription
television in most communities, rather than local systems employing the most
rational combinations of technologies for each geographic market.
Initially called "community antenna television" (CATV), cable was
developed in the United States in the late 1940s." These early systems
were used primarily to improve reception of over-the-air broadcast signals
for subscribers who, due to local topography, could not receive clear
ten feet in diameter. Ku-Band antennas are roughly three feet or less in diameter. See
BROADCAST TELEVISION IN A MULTICHANNEL MARKETPLACE, supra note 3, at 96.
9. Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (1984) (current version at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-611
(1991)).
10. Currently, about ninety percent of the homes in the country are passed by cable systems
and over sixty percent of these homes subscribe to cable. 138 CONG. REC. S561 (daily ed. Jan.
29, 1992) (statement of Sen. Inouye). An estimated fifty-four million households have basic
cable in 1992. Paul Farhi, Reregulating Cable: A Political Response to a Wired Nation, WASH.
POST, Jan. 22, 1992, at Al.
11. See DANIEL L. BRENNER, ET AL., CABLE TELEVISION AND OTHER NONBROADCAST
VIDEO § 1.02 (1991).
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reception of television signals. Beginning in the 1960s, CATV, or "cable
television" as it came to be known, branched out, importing distant broadcast
signals in order to provide programming to its subscribers.
At first, cable television developed slowly. This was due in part to
technology-specific regulatory barriers which protected broadcasters from
cable competition. For example, in the 1970s cable's development was
hindered by the Federal Communication Commission's (FCC's) "anti-
siphoning" rules. The FCC promulgated rules which prohibited cable
operators from providing movies that were more than three, but less than
ten, years old.12 Cable operators were also prohibited from airing specific
sports events shown on broadcast television within the previous five years.13
In 1977, the "anti-siphoning" rules were struck down by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia on the grounds that they were beyond
the FCC's jurisdiction, unsupported by the record, and violative of the first
amendment. 4 The removal of these restrictive regulations helped pave the
way for cable to compete with broadcast television by offering a full range
of alternative programming.
The "anti-siphoning" rules were just one regulatory hindrance in cable's
early development. During the 1970s cable's growth was also impeded by
distant signal,15 syndicated program exclusivity, 6 minimum channel
capacity, 7 and leased access rules.' However, as each of these rules was
rescinded or struck down, and as Congress and the FCC began to encourage
the emergence of cable, the industry began to flourish. Unfortunately, in its
efforts to promote cable, the government established rules that later would
unintentionally hinder the development of alternative subscription television
technologies. Ironically, this caused the children of cable-its technological
12. 47 C.F.R. § 73.643 (1975).
13. Id.
14. Home Box Office v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
15.47 C.F.R. §§ 76.59(b)-(e), .61(b)-(f), .63 (1980). These rules, which limited the number
of signals from distant stations that a cable system could transmit to its subscribers, were
repealed in 1980. Cable Television Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, 79 F.C.C.2d 663
(1980), aff'd sub nom. Mairite T.V. of New York v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied sub nom. National Football League v. FCC, 454 U.S. 1143 (1982).
16. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.151-.161 (1980). These rules, which authorized a local television
station which had purchased exclusive exhibition rights to a program, to demand that a local
cable system delete that program from its distant signals, regardless of whether the television
station was simultaneously showing, or ever planning to show the program, were repealed in
1980 along with the distant signal rules. In re Cable Television Syndicated Program Exclusivity
Rules, 79 F.C.C.2d 663.
17. 47 C.F.R. § 76.252 (1977).
18. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.254, .256 (1977). Together, the minimum channel capacity and leased
access rules required "cable television systems that ha[d] 3,500 or more subscribers and earr[ied]
broadcast signals to develop, at a minimum, a 20-channel capacity by 1986, to make available
certain channels for access by third parties, and to furnish equipment and facilities for access
purposes." FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 691 (1979). Both of these rules were
struck down by the Supreme Court in 1979. Id.
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offspring-to face an even stiffer fight to gain a toehold in the market-
place.19 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the cable industry grew
dramatically, facing virtually no competition in the subscription television
market. Both technological advancements and favorable government policy
propelled the industry forward. Newly emerging satellite technology enabled
cable to efficiently distribute programming, including the made-for-cable
programming that was becoming available. Gradually, cable began to offer
innovative programming that was not available through over-the-air
broadcasting.
Legislative, regulatory, and judicial decisions contributed to cable's rapid
emergence as the preeminent subscription distribution system. For example,
the cable industry was assisted by the enactment of pole attachment
legislation. Because most cable systems use poles to run their wires to their
subscribers, the ability to access existing utility poles is crucial to the cable
industry. During the early 1970s, the cable industry battled with the
telephone and utility industries over access to telephone and utility poles. In
certain cases, the telephone and utility companies were accused of demanding
highly unreasonable pole attachment rates from the cable companies.'
In response to this heated battle and the FCC's decisions that it lacked
jurisdiction to regulate cable television pole attachments on non-telephone
utility poles" as well as on telephone utility poles,' Congress enacted pole
attachment legislation to assist the young cable industry. Under this
19. Ironically, in its early pursuit of legislative assistance, the cable industry voiced many
of the same arguments its competitors and newly evolving technologies have raised against cable
during the late 1980s and 1990s. See, e.g., Hearing on Domestic Telecommunications Common
Carrier Policies Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce,
Science and Transportation, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1066 (1977) (statement of Ralph M. Baruch,
President and CEO, Viacom International, Inc.) ("[G]overnment should foster competition. I
believe that monopolies have no incentive to innovate, to bring about technological advances
which the American consumer can expect and should obtain."); Hearing on Pay Cable Television
Industry Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1975) (statement of Ralph M. Baruch, President and CEO, Viacom
International, Inc.) ("I would also suggest that this committee consider taking the necessary steps
to make certain that no medium have the right to exclude product from any other medium.");
Oversight Hearing on Cable Television Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 176 (1977) (statement
of Ralph M. Baruch, President and CEO, Viacom) ("Well, what are the broadcasters really
concerned about? It seems to me that all they are concerned about, and this was illustratel here
again, is competition. Now, competition I don't think this should concern them particularly.
And we have never seen a television station go off the air because of either cable or pay
cable."); Id. at 179 ("If the networks continue or increase their exclusivity against pay cable,
I believe there is a move designed to foreclose competition.").
20. See S. Rep. No. 580, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
109, 121.
21. In re California Water and Tel. Co., Tariff F.C.C. No. 1 and Tariff F.C.C. No. 2
Applicable to Channel Service for Use by Community Antenna Televisions Systems, 37 Rad.
Reg. 2d (P & F) 1166 (1976) (Memorandum Opinion and Order).
22. In re California Water and Tel. Co., Tariff F.C.C. No. I and Tariff F.C.C. No. 2
Applicable to Channel Service for Use by Community Antenna Televisions Systems, 64
F.C.C.2d 753 (1977) (Memorandum Opinion and Order).
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legislation, the FCC was granted jurisdictionz to ensure that the "rates,
terms and conditions" for pole attachments' are "just and reasonable." 25
By ensuring the cable industry's fair access to utility poles, this legislation
helped "[lead] the way for the expansion of the cable industry and its
prosperity. "'
The final boost which assured the preeminence of coaxial cable in the
market was the enactment of the 1984 Cable Act.27 This Act created the
first national policy towards cable television.' Before the 1984 Cable Act,
"the FCC had only indirect authority to oversee the cable industry, which it
23. Jurisdiction is limited to states which do not employ their own attachment regulations.
47 U.S.C. § 224(c)(1) (1992).
Each State which regulates the rates, terms, and conditions for pole attachments shall
certify to the Commission that-
(A) it regulates such rates, terms, and conditions; and
(B) in so regulating such rates, terms, and conditions, the State has the authority to
consider and does consider the interest of the subscribers of cable television services,
as well as the interests of the consumers of the utility services.
47 U.S.C. § 224(c)(2) (1992).
24. "Pole attachment" is defined by the statute as "any attachment by a cable television
system to a pole, duct, conduit, or right-of-way owned or controlled by a utility. 47 U.S.C. §
224(a)(4) (1992).
25. 47 U.S.C. § 224(b)(1) (1992) ("mhe Commission shall regulate the rates, terms, and
conditions for pole attachments to provide that such rates, terms, and conditions are just and
reasonable, and shall adopt procedures necessary and appropriate to hear and resolve complaints
concerning such rates, terms, and conditions...."). A rate is
just and reasonable if it assures a utility the recovery of not less than the additional
costs of providing pole attachments, nor more than an amount determined by
multiplying the percentage of the total usable space, or the percentage of the total
duct or conduit capacity, which is occupied by the pole attachment by the sum of the
operating expenses and actual capital costs of the utility attributable to the entire pole,
duct, conduit, or right-of-way.
47 U.S.C. § 224(d)(1) (1992).
26. 138 CONG. REc. S588 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 1992) (statement of Sen. Hollings).
27. 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-611 (1991). See, e.g., 138 CONG. REC. S655 (daily ed. Jan. 30,
1992) (statement of Sen. Wirth)
mhe Cable Act of 1984... effectively knocked down the barriers ... to the entry
of cable television into the communications marketplace. ... It did what it was
intended to do. It allowed the cable television industry to expand and gave them a
financial base and a certain amount of financial stability, and allowed cable television
to really move into a kind of maturity and begin to exercise and realize its potential.
When that happened, the number of households subscribing doubled.... The
number of channels have increased dramatically, and cable television is now
providing a wealth of programming.
Id.
28. "The Communications Act of 1934... was enacted well before the advent of cable
television. As a result, there has never been a national policy to guide the development of
cable.... [This bill] establishes a national policy that clarifies the current system of local, state
and Federal regulation of cable television. . ." H.R. Rep. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 19
(1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4655, 4656.
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obtained by virtue of its obligation to ensure that broadcasters served the
public interest."" In all but about a dozen states which had laws control-
ling certain cable activities, local government entities controlled cable
because these systems had to pass through public rights of way. "As a
result, the cable industry was subjected to a crazy quilt of regulation, often
to its detriment and to that of the subscriber. " 30
Believed to be suffering from the hand of government regulation, cable
was in great part deregulated by the 1984 Cable Act. Supporters of the 1984
Cable Act urged that competition from "such sources as MDS, MATV,
SMATV, DBS, STV, television, radio, movie screens, videocassettes,
LPTV, and other media" 31 would keep cable in line. The 1984 Cable Act
provided that a cable system's prices would not be regulated as long as the
system faced "effective competition," as defined by the FCC.32 Congress
intended that "the 1984 [Cable] Act [would provide] the cable industry with
the potential to develop its systems and its programming."'
The 1984 Cable Act achieved part of what it set out to do-it assured
that cable became a robust and productive industry. However, there is
mounting concern that the reality of today's marketplace is entirely
inconsistent with the other purpose behind the 1984 Cable Act. That purpose
was to "allow cable television to become a vigorous and effective competi-
tor,"' while at the same time serving "the best interests of consumers."35
As Senator Danforth, sponsor of recent cable reform legislation,' has
stated, cable's "impressive growth has been achieved by a distortion in the
marketplace. Cable today is an unregulated monopoly. The promise of
competition goes unrealized today."" 7
The cable television industry has evolved far beyond the entity that
arguably needed protection in 1984. While in 1984 cable was "largely a
collection of local franchise operators dependent on the major networks and
the vaults of Hollywood reruns for programming,"" today the cable
industry is dominated by large multiple system operators (MSOs),39 such as
29. S. Rep. No. 381, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1990).
30. Id.
31. S. Rep. No. 67, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1983).
32. 47 U.S.C. § 543(b) (1988).
33. S. Rep. No. 381, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1990).
34. 130 CONG. REC. 4854 (1984) (statement of Rep. Bliley).
35. 130 CONG. REC. 27,975 (1984) (statement of Rep. Wirth). In response to concerns about
the lack of competition in the cable industry, a number of cable reform bills have been
introduced in Congress. See, e.g., S. 12; H.R. 1303, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
36. S. 12.
37. 138 CONG. REC. S412 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1992) (statement of Sen. Danforth).
38. David R. Poe, As the World Turns: Cable Television and the qcle of Regulation, 43
FED. COMM. L.J. 141, 144 (1991).
39. MSOs are large cable companies that own a number of local cable systems.
238 [Vol. 28
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Tele-Communications Inc., which have monopoly power' and significant
control over their programmers, competitors, local broadcasters, and
consumers.
Cable's hold on the market extends both vertically and horizontally.
Vertical integration occurs when a single company owns or controls both the
programming and distribution systems. Because many of the cable networks
are owned or controlled by the large cable MSOs,1 these operators control
the flow of programming.42 This vertical integration encourages cable
operators to favor the programming in which they have equity interests.
Vertically integrated cable programmers often refuse to offer programming
to competing cable systems or alternative technologies or do so only at
discriminatory prices and conditions."
In addition, since deregulation, cable has become increasingly horizontal-
ly concentrated. In 1985, the five largest MSOs served approximately 29
percent of the cable subscribing households in the country and by 1990, the
five largest companies served almost half the nation's subscribers.'
Cable's horizontal control of the market raises concerns about both the
availability of diverse programming and anticompetitive acts by the large
cable operators.'
40. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 92, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1991) ("A cable system serving a
local community, with rare exceptions, enjoys a monopoly."); 138 CONG. REC. S583 (daily ed.
Jan. 29, 1992) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum) ("From the moment the 1984 Cable Act became
law, consumers have been at the mercy of an unregulated monopoly.... Why have cable TV
rates risen at such an alarming rate? Because the cable industry can hike them with impunity.
There is no competitor to undercut them, and there is no regulator to restrain them."); 138
CONG. REc. S583 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 1992) (statement of Sen. Leahy) ("The root of the problem
in the cable industry is that cable is an unregulated monopoly."). For investigative reports of
Tele-Communications, Inc., see Paul Farhi, Fear, Loathing and Respect for Cable's Leader;
TC1's Size Draws Controversy, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 1992, at Al; Johnnie L. Roberts, How
Giant TCI Uses Self-Dealing, Hardball to Dominate Market, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 1992, at Al.
41. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 92, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1991); 138 CONG. REC. S566
(daily ed. Jan. 29, 1992) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum) ("Ten of the 15 most popular basic
cable networks are owned or controlled by multisystem cable operators.").
42. In the last four years no new programming service has emerged in which a large cable
MSO has not taken an equity interest.
43. S. Rep. No. 92, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1991).
44. See, e.g., Media Ownership: Diversity and Concentration: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. 88 (1989) (statement of Ben Bagdikian) ("Mhe major cable companies
increasingly insist on owning a financial interest in shows and programs they use on their
channels, and since in most cities, the cable system is a local monopoly, they have total control
of content, on their terms, both as to the producers and in choices presented to the cable
audience."); id. at 307 (statement of Preston Padden, INTV) ("As a practical matter, it is almost
impossible in the present environment to start a new cable system service without surrendering
equity to the owners of the monopoly cable conduits.").
45. S. Rep. No. 92, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1991). See also, Top 100 MSOs,
CABLEVISION, Feb. 10, 1992, at 36.
46. See S. Rep. No. 92, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 32-34 (1991). Congress is currently
considering legislation which would shield consumers from cable's potential abuses of its
horizontal and vertical market powers. See, e.g., S. 12, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R.
1303, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991).
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Today, cable has grown to provide millions of subscribers with increased
channel capacity and a wide variety of programming. 47 However, cable's
position of dominance was achieved in large part through beneficial laws
such as the 1984 Cable Act and is propped up by regulatory impediments to
the use of other technologies that provide consumers with competitive
services.
II. BARRIERS TO TELEPHONE COMPANY
ENTRY INTO THE VIDEO MARKETPLACE
While cable has benefitted from regulation's helping hand, legal barriers
generally have prevented another major player-the telephone industry-from
participating in the video marketplace. Telephone company (telco) entry into
the video marketplace has been restricted by three barriers: (1) judicial
decree, (2) the 1984 Cable Act, and (3) FCC regulations. The telephone
industry and others argue that these restrictions unfairly impede the telephone
companies from providing valuable competition and technological advances
in the video marketplace. Despite serious opposition, momentum is building
to ease each of the existing legal barriers to telco entry into the marketplace.
A. Judicial Decree
As part of the 1984 court-ordered break-up of American Telephone and
Telegraph Co.," the newly created regional Bell Operating Companies
(RBOCs) were barred from entering the information services industry.49
The prohibition on "information services" was modified in 1987 to allow the
RBOCs to perform gateway functions.' Other than this modification, the
bar remained in effect until 1991, when Judge Harold Greene, who is
responsible for overseeing the AT&T break-up, very reluctantly held that the
RBOCs could enter the information services industry.5' The court of
appeals still must rule on Judge Greene's order which has been appealed by
47. See, e.g., 138 CONG. REC. S654-57 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1992) (statement of Sen. Wirth).
48. See United States v. American Tel. &Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd
sub nom. Maryland v. U.S., 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
49. Section II D of the Modification of Final Judgment in AT&T, prohibits the regional Bell
operating companies from providing "information services." AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 227.
"Information services" are defined in section IV of the Decree as "the offering of a capability
for generating, acquiring, storing, transferring, processing, retrieving, utilizing or making
available information which may be conveyed via telecommunications." Id. at 229.
50. United States v. Western Electric Co., 673 F. Supp. 525 (D.D.C. 1987). The RBOCs
were permitted to acquire and operate the infrastructure needed to transmit information services
generated by others. However, the RBOCs were still prohibited from generating their own
information content.
51. United States v. Western Electric Co., 767 F. Supp. 308 (D.D.C. 1991) stay vacated,
1991 WL 238308 (D.C. Cir.) (lifting Judge Greene's stay as an "abuse of discretion").
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newspapers, cable companies, and other organizations.52 Assuming Judge
Greene's order stands, the RBOCs can now provide information services,
including advertising, stock quotes, sports scores, news reports, and
electronic "yellow pages." 53
However, even if Judge Greene's order is upheld, statutory restrictions
still prevent the telephone industry from fully entering the video marketplace.
The Cable Act of 1984 includes cross-ownership provisions prohibiting
telephone companies from providing video programming to subscribers in
their telephone service areas.' In its report accompanying the 1984 Cable
Act, the House Energy and Commerce Committee stated that "nothing in this
section shall be construed to limit telephone company provision of informa-
tion services or other non-video programming, transmissions or communica-
tions services."55 Thus, if Judge Greene's order is upheld, the 1984 Cable
Act's restrictions on telephone companies will not go so far as to provide for
an independent restriction on the ability of the RBOCs to provide information
services.
B. FCC Regulations
The FCC has also enacted rules limiting telco entry. These rules, which
were adopted in 1970, provide that no telephone company "shall engage in
the provision of video programming to the viewing public in its telephone
service area either directly, or indirectly through an affiliate."' There are
two possible exceptions to this general prohibition. First, rural areas, as
defined by the FCC are exempted." Second, a waiver to the general rule
may be obtained
[i]n those areas where the provision of video programming to the
viewing public demonstrably could not exist except through a cable
system owned by,... or affiliated with the local telephone common
carrier, or upon other showing of good cause.., if the Commis-
sion finds that the public interest, convenience and necessity would
52. Western Electric Co., 767 F. Supp. 308, appeal docketed, e.g., No. 91-5263 (D.C. Cir.
Aug. 30, 1991).
53. Phone Finns Cleared to Offer Data Services, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 31, 1991, at D-3.
54. 47 U.S.C. § 533(b)(1) (1992). This restriction does not apply to common earrers
providing local service to rural areas, as defined by the FCC. 47 U.S.C. 533(b)(3) (1992).
Currently, Congress is seriously considering widening the rural exemption. A bill that recently
passed the Senate included a provision which would expand the definition of "rural areas" in
which telephone companies could provide cable television services. "Rural areas" would be
newly defined as areas without an incorporated community of more than 10,000 residents, an
increase over the current 2,500 resident limit. S. 12, § 24, 138 CONG. REC. S666 (daily ed.
Jan. 30, 1992).
55. H.R. Rep. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4655, 4694.
56. 47 C.F.R. § 63.54(a) (1991).
57. 47 C.F.R. § 63.58 (1991). See also supra note 54.
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be served thereby.5"
The FCC is currently considering amending its policies to allow greater
telco entry into the video marketplace. Most recently, the FCC proposed a
rule to permit the regional Bell operating companies to provide "video dial
tone."' Under the video dial tone plan, the RBOCs could carry video,
voice, and data services over their networks.' However, due to the 1984
Cable Act's cross-ownership provisions, the local telephone companies would
still be prevented from owning or originating the video programming carried
on these systems. Instead, the telcos would be required to offer channel
space to other program providers, such as existing broadcast stations, or
cable networks such as ESPN, on a first come, first serve basis.61
The video dial tone would be offered in two levels of service. The first
level would consist of certain basic regulated services and "would provide
an 'electronic platform' or 'window' that opens to a broader network."62
Through this system, end users could access video and non-video communi-
cation services provided by a variety of competitive service providers. The
second level would consist of enhanced services subject to competition
among service providers.'s This second level would permit a telco to
provide an "advanced video gateway and related non-programming
services."'
This plan has been criticized by the cable industry, as well as the
telcos.1 In order to enact this proposal, the FCC must overcome not only
this opposition, the FCC must also mollify concerns that the telephone
companies will abuse their market power, engage in discriminatory behavior,
and pass the costs of building a fiber-optic network to telephone customers.
58.47 C.F.R. § 63.56(a) (1991).
59. 56 Fed. Reg. 65,464 (1991).
60. FCC Pushes Telco Video Dial Tone, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Oct. 28, 1991, at 41.
61. See id.; Paul Farhi, FCC Favors Phone Firms Providing TV Service, WASH. POST, Oct.
25, 1991, at AI2.
62. 56 Fed. Reg. 65,465 (1991) (These basic services are regulated under Title II of the
Communications Act which regulates common carrier services.).
63. Id. (These are services not regulated by Title II.).
64. 56 Fed. Reg. 65,465 (1991). Such a "gateway" would consist "essentially [of] a menu
and other aids to help users navigate through network services, and non-video programming
services, such as billing and collection." FCC Pushes Telco Video Dial Tone, supra note 61,
at 41.
65. Members of the cable industry assert that the video dial tone plan would violate the 1984
Cable Act's prohibition on cable-telco cress-ownership while telcos generally argue that the plan
does not go far enough. See FCC Video Dial Tone Proposal Unpopular With Most Commenters,
COMMUNICATION DAILY, Feb. 5, 1992, at 2.
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C. Congress and Telco Entry
In addition to the uncertainties surrounding the status of the Modification
of Final Judgment and the FCC regulations on telco entry into the video
programming marketplace, Congress is considering a number of bills
concerning this issue. Congress, however, has not yet reached a consensus
on how telecommunications policies should affect telco entry. At one
extreme, legislation has been introduced which would combat efforts at the
FCC and in the courts to ease limitations on telco entry by codifying
restrictions on telephone company participation in the video marketplace. At
the other extreme, legislation has been introduced which would step beyond
actions taken by the FCC and the courts to further ease restrictions on telco
entry.
Some members of Congress support legislation which would make telco
entry into the video marketplace difficult. While there are some differences
in the House 6 and Senate67 versions of such legislation, both bills would
restrict the RBOCs from offering information services, such as video yellow
pages and electronic publishing services, in their local telephone service
regions until they face competition for local telephone service.' These bills
also attempt to safeguard against cross-subsidization by the telephone
companies by requiring RBOCs to form separate subsidiaries in order to
provide information services.'
Proponents of these restrictions claim that such legislation is necessary
to prevent the abuse of market power by RBOCs that inevitably would result
if they were let into the information services market. The proponents argue
that the RBOCs would cross-subsidize and discriminate against competitors
and that the FCC and state regulators are not equipped to adequately monitor
such anti-competitive acts.'
In contrast, proponents of telco entry support legislation such as the
Communications Competitiveness and Infrastructure Modernization Act.7'
That bill would permit increased telco entry to encourage the modernization
of the nation's telecommunications infrastructure and to promote competition
to the cable industry. Initially, this legislation would allow telephone
66. H.R. 3515, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
67. S. 2112.
68. Competition would exist if at least fifty percent of residential and business users have
access to competitive phone service and at least ten percent of the market subscribe to this
competitive service. S. 2112, § 227; H.R. 351 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). In the Senate
version of this legislation, this entry test would expire after twelve years. S. 2112, § 227. The
House version, H.R. 3515, contains no such sunset provision.
69. S. 2112, § 227.
70. See, e.g., 138 CONG. REc. S18,435-38 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991) (statement of Sen.
Inouye).
71. H.R. 2546; S. 1200.
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companies to engage only in video dial tone services. 72 The telcos would
not be allowed to transport their own programs. Only after securing
approval from the FCC and a state regulatory commission could telephone
companies begin to offer their own programs. 73
This legislation includes a number of provisions designed to preventfuture anti-competitive actions by the telcos.74 For example, the telephone
companies could only offer their own programs on twenty-five percent of
their channel capacity, thus leaving the remaining seventy-five percent forprograms from outside parties.' Additional safeguards include prohibitions
on both cross-subsidizatio 7 6 and buyouts of existing cable systems,7 the
requirement of separate video programming subsidiaries,78 and a "death
penalty" which would mandate the telco's divestiture of its separate videoprogramming subsidiary for willful violations of any safeguard. 9
Sponsors of this legislation maintain that by allowing the telephone
companies to enter the video programming marketplace, this legislation
would create the incentive for these companies to modernize the telecommu-
nications infrastructure.s' This improved infrastructure, they assert, will
enable telcos to deploy a valuable fiber optic network into homes, businesses,
schools, and health care institutions.81 Moreover, this advanced nationwide
telecommunications infrastructure would allow the U.S. to compete with
those nations, including Japan, which already have committed themselves to
the development of their own domestic fiber optic networks.2 Supporters
of telco entry legislation also argue that eased telco entry will increase
competition in the video marketplace by providing an alternative to coaxial
cable.
The telco entry issue illustrates an inadvertent, yet common, result ofU.S. telecommunications policies. Often technology-specific restrictions,
such as various bars to telco entry and analogous cross-ownership restric-
tions,' are driven by the perception that powerful established industries
such as telcos or cable must be prevented from using emerging technologies
to abuse or extend their market power. Some fear that without such
72. H.R. 2546 § 303(a); S. 1200 § 303(a).
73. H.R. 2546 § 303(a); S. 1200 § 303(a).
74. See H.R. 2546 § 303(a); S. 1200 § 303(a).
75. H.R. 2546 § 303(a); S. 1200 § 303(a).
76. H.R. 2546 § 303(a); S. 1200 § 303(a).
77. H.R. 2546 § 303(a); S. 1200 § 303(a).
78. H.R. 2546 § 303(a); S. 1200 § 303(a).
79. H.R. 2546 § 303(a); S. 1200 § 303(a).
80. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 2546 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications andFinance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (statement
of Congressman Boucher, June 26, 1991) (not yet published).
81. See, e.g., id.
82. See 138 CONG. REc. S7055 (daily ed. June 5, 1991) (statement of Sen. Bums).
83. For discussion of cross-ownership restrictions see infra Section III.B.
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restrictions consumers will be deprived of the potential full benefits of the
new technologies." However, these well-motivated intentions have been
outpaced by changes in the marketplace. Preventing abuses by keeping telcos
out of the business entirely may be unnecessarily restrictive and may deprive
consumers of the benefits of advanced technology' and a competitive
service.
The solution to the concern that telephone companies, if let into the
video marketplace, would abuse their market power is not to prevent entirely
the particular technology from competing in the market. Rather, the better
solution is to open the market to new technologies, including the telephone
industry, and to implement safeguards to prevent all technologies from
engaging in anti-competitive practices. To develop laws that are more
technology-neutral while notjeopardizing consumer interests, lawmakers may
start with safeguards like those set out in the Communications Competitive-
ness and Infrastructure Modernization Act.' For example, cross-subsidiza-
tion and buyouts of existing cable systems should be prohibited and separate
video programming subsidiaries should be required.' While the telephone
industry's monopolistic tendencies do raise valid concerns, these concerns
84. For example, one principal argument against telco entry is that due to the telcos' cross-
subsidization, consumers will end up paying increased telephone rates. Some also argue that
because telco entry will in essence replace one monopoly-the cable industry, with another-the
telcos, consumers will ultimately be precluded from receiving the benefits of a competitive
subscription television marketplace.
Another example involves concerns about cable acquiring rights to other technologies and
either warehousing them or otherwise assuring that they could not be used as competitive
subscription television providers. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 92, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1991).
Consider, for example, the controversy surrounding the "K Prime" deal in which concerns were
raised that a group of nine MSOs attempted to foreclose competition from DBS by controlling
all of the then commercially available satellite transponder capacity for DBS service. In 1990,
GE American Communications and a group of nine MSOs agreed to form a joint venture (K
Prime) to launch a direct broadcast satellite service, known as Primestar, using GE's Satcom KI
Ku-band satellite. Since K Prime would provide only ten stations (seven superstations and three
pay-per-view channels), critics argued that the venture was designed merely to supplement rather
than compete with cable. See, e.g., Jeannine Aversa, Cable Opponents Say DBS Not
Competition, MULTICHANNEL NEws, Feb. 26, 1990, at 3. Presently, a number of states are
apparently considering filing antitrust actions alleging that this joint venture "acted for the
purpose of forestalling competitors who might use the satellite to circumvent local, hardwired
cable TV monopolies." Multi-state Cable TV Monopolization Suit Nears; Justice Department
Undecided on Federal Charges, FTC: WATCH, Mar. 9, 1992. The K Prime situation does not,
however, establish that cross-ownership in itself is anticompetitive and harmful to consumers.
While deals that are clearly anti-competitive should be prohibited under the antitrust laws,
policymakers must be careful not to restrict those cross-ownership arrangements that may
stimulate competition and technological advancement.
85. This point may be made for other cross-ownership restrictions as well. It may well be
time to consider the merit of encouraging cable MSOs to enter the telephone business, which
in turn might, through competition, ameliorate concerns about telco entry into the cable business.
86. H.R. 2546; S. 1200. See supra text accompanying notes 71-79.
87. As such measures are debated additional safeguards will likely be suggested. For
example, a provision ensuring fair access to the telco's fiber loop by competing cable and
alternative technology operators may be needed. See Daniel Brenner, Telephone Company Entry
Into Video Services: A First Amendment Analysis, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 97, 109 (1991).
Concerns that the FCC and state regulators lack the resources to adequately monitor
anticompetitive practices of the telcos must also be addressed.
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should be addressed in a technology-neutral manner that prevents any
industry, including both the cable and telephone industries, from engaging
in discriminatory conduct.
III. LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON THE GROWTH OF ALTERNATIVE
MULTICHANNEL VIDEO DELIVERY TECHNOLOGIES
While cable was experiencing its initial growth spurt in the 1970s, it
faced minimal competition because technologically feasible alternative
distribution systems were not yet legally possible as viable multichannel
alternatives. Even as innovations and the growth of the market made the use
of alternative technologies more attractive, their expansion has been slowed
by an inhospitable regulatory environment as well as opposition from the
entrenched cable industry. Technologically and economically viable
alternative distribution systems include wireless cable, satellite master
antenna television service, home satellite dishes, and direct broadcast satellite
systems.
A. Alternative Delivery Systems
1. Wireless Cable (MDS, MMDS, ITFS, OFS)
"Wireless cable" was created by the FCC to stimulate competition with
traditional cable television. Wireless cable systems utilize the Super High
Frequency (SHF) portion of the microwave radio frequency spectrum to
transmit multiple channels of video programming over the air from terrestrial
transmitters to small antennas mounted on subscribers' rooftops. Wireless
cable can provide services in some areas that are not wired for coaxial cable,
such as rural areas and inner cities. Typically, operating with lower fixed
costs, wireless cable can deliver as good or better picture quality and signal
security than coaxial cable at competitive prices. Accordingly, wireless can
also compete in cable-wired areas thus providing an alternative to the local
coaxial cable system. Government regulation, however, unintentionally
prevented wireless cable from developing at a natural pace to provide this
competition to cable television.
In the mid-1980s, the FCC began enabling the expansion of wireless
cable's multipoint distribution system from a single channel to a multichannel
business. The first of the FCC decisions that made wireless cable possible
as a commercial venture was not issued until late 1983, and it took several
more years for the complete regulatory structure to develop."8 Pursuant to
88. See, e.g., In re Amendment of Parts 2, 21, 74 and 94 of the Commission's Rules and
Regulations in Regard to the Instruction Fixed Television Service, the Multipoint Distribution
Service, and the Private Operation Fixed Microwave Service, 94 F.C.C.2d 1203 (1983), recon.
denied, 49 Fed. Reg. 27,147 (1984) (allocated spectrum for and established rules governing
MMDS); 50 Fed. Reg. 5,983 (1985) (allowed for lotteries to select MMDS licensees); 51 Fed.
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FCC decisions issued from 1983 to 1987, wireless cable is now able to
provide multi-channel programming using a combination of the following
government created services: multichannel multipoint distribution service
(MMDS), multipoint distribution service (MDS), and instructional fixed
television services (ITFS). 9 Through its combination of services, wireless
cable can now provide up to 33 channels of satellite programming along with
the locally available broadcast television signals.
The FCC authorized wireless cable because it recognized that "there is
no multichannel alternative to cable available now."' However, wireless
cable, like other alternative technologies, is the victim of unintended
regulatory impediments. Because wireless cable was created by combining
different microwave services for commercial purposes (i.e., MDS, MMDS,
and ITFS), it has suffered from fragmented regulation by different bureaus
of the FCC. Until recently, wireless cable was subject to the FCC's
Common Carrier,91 Mass Media,' and Private Radio93 Bureaus, each of
which acts independently. Having to deal with each bureau separately
contributed to wireless cable's lengthy FCC licensing process and compound-
ed the difficulty of navigating the regulatory process on a variety of issues.
Recognizing this problem, the FCC recently reallocated the three H Group
OFS channels to MDS. 4 This rule eliminates an additional regulatory
burden on wireless cable, because the industry will generally no longer be
governed by the Private Radio Bureau.95
Recently, the FCC has removed other regulatory obstacles in wireless
cable's path. Recognizing that many of the rules affecting wireless cable
were "established in the infancy of the various services they govern, long
before the development of the wireless cable industry"' and that these
"rules not only contain possibly obsolete limitations but also vary substantial-
Reg. 17,969 (1986) (extended the cutoff date for submitting settlement agreements pertaining
to MMDS to ten days before the lottery); 52 Fed. Reg. 27,553 (1987) (permitted each MDS
licensee to choose to provide MDS on a common carnier or non-common carrier basis, and
enacted other rules to help enable MDS operators to "respond to market forces").
89. 1TFS uses the same microwave frequencies used by educators. In the past, wireless cable
has also used the operational fixed service (OFS), which employs the same microwave
frequencies used for many years by municipalities. See 56 Fed. Reg. 57,808 (1991).
90. See See, e.g., In re Amendment of Parts 2, 21, 74 and 94 of the Commission's Rules
and Regulations in Regard to the Instruction Fixed Television Service, the Multipoint
Distribution Service, and the Private Operation Fixed Microwave Service, 54 Rad. Reg. 2d (P
& F) 107, 123 (1983).
91. The Common Carrier Bureau processes MDS and MMDS applications.
92. The Mass Media Bureau regulates ITFS applications.
93. The Private Radio Bureau has, in the past, dealt with OFS licenses.
94. 56 Fed. Reg. 57,808 (1991).
95. One exception to this new rule is that the Private Radio Bureau will continue to
administer point-to-point authorizations. See Paul Sinderbrand, Wireless Continues to Prevail at
the FCC, PRIvATE CABLE, Nov. 1991, at 40.
96. 55 Fed. Reg. 46,007 (1990).
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ly from service to service," 97 the FCC took needed steps to help bring the
regulatory framework up to speed with technological advances. For
example, in 1990, the FCC eliminated rules barring common ownership of
MMDS and Operational Fixed Service (H Group OFS) channels in a given
market." In accordance with these new rules, a single wireless operator
may now secure all of the MMDS and OFS channels available in a single
market.
The FCC's recent rule clarifying the definition of "cable system" in the
1984 Cable Act may also eliminate some inadvertent regulatory hurdles
facing wireless cable. Under the Act, an operator of a "cable system,"
which is defined as a "facility, consisting of a set of closed transmission
paths,"" must obtain a local cable franchise."°  While this text suggested
that Congress had not intended to include systems merely transmitting via
microwave, two lower courts had misread this definition by holding that
transmissions over the airwaves constituted use of "a set of closed transmis-
sion paths." 10' To clarify the issue, the FCC issued a Report and Order
which ruled that systems which only use radio waves to interconnect separate
buildings are not "cable systems" under the 1984 Cable Act and therefore are
not subject to the requirement to secure a local cable franchise."°
In this instance, the FCC acted to correct an inadvertent misinter-
pretation of Congress' intent to distinguish between certain technologies.
Because systems such as wireless cable do not use public rights-of-way, but
only utilize radio facilities to interconnect buildings, Congress, as reflected
in its definition of "cable system," did not intend to subject these systems to
the franchise requirement0 3 Here, Congress acted pursuant to a valid
underlying policy distinction-that only those systems utilizing public rights-
of-way should be required to secure a local cable franchise. In those cases
where distinct regulatory treatment of certain technologies is based on such
legitimate policy concerns, the courts must be careful not to hinder individual
technological growth with unintended regulatory barriers.
However, the definition of "cable system" contains an additional
distinction that is not based on such an underlying policy. In certain cases,
even if a system does not use public rights of way, it may be a "cable
97. Id.
98. See 56 Fed. Reg. 46,006 (1990).
99. 47 U.S.C. § 552(6) (1988).
100. 47 U.S.C. § 541 (1988).
101. See City of Fargo v. Prime Time Entertainment, No. A3-87-47, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16506 (D.N.D. March 28, 1988); Pacific & Southern Co. v. Satellite Broadcast Networks, 694
F. Supp. 1565 (N.D. Ga. 1988), rev'd sub nom. National Broadcasting Co. v. Satellite
Broadcast Networks, 940 F.2d 1467 (11th Cir. 1991).
102. 56 Fed. Reg. 1931 (1991). According to the FCC, operators who use wiring to connect
buildings are subject to the 1984 Cable Act's requirements unless (1) the interconnected
buildings are multiple unit dwellings under common ownership, management or control; and (2)
their wiring is located solely on private property. Id.
103. See 56 Fed. Reg. 1930 (1991).
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system" and thus be subject to local franchise requirements. This wrinkle
in the 1984 Cable Act may unintentionally hinder the full development of
SMATV systems."
2. SMATV-Satellite Master Antenna Television
Satellite Master Antenna Television (SMATV), commonly known as
"private cable," typically serves subscribers residing in private multi-unit
dwellings, including apartment complexes, housing parks, hotels, and
hospitals. The SMATV service combines a master antenna television system
which links the units in the dwelling to a single external television antenna,
and a receive-only satellite earth station.
Like other alternative subscription television technologies, SMATV's
ability to compete has been affected by regulatory policies. For example, the
SMATV industry has raised concerns about the definition of "cable system"
in the 1984 Cable Act. As discussed above, "cable systems," as defined by
the Act, are subject to franchise requirements. Due to the underlying policy
distinction singling out those technologies that use public rights-of-way,
SMATV systems serving more than one multiple unit building connected
only by radio are not "cable systems."" ° However, private cable systems
that serve "multiple unit dwellings connected by physically closed transmis-
sion paths are cable systems, unless the buildings are both (a) under common
control or ownership, and (b) do not use a public right-of-way. " 6 Thus,
under the 1984 Cable Act, a private cable system that does not use public
rights of way, but only connects adjacent multiple unit dwellings not under
common ownership constitutes a "cable system" and is subject to franchise
requirements merely because of the closed transmission path technology it
employs. On the other hand, those systems using radio frequencies to
connect separately owned multiple unit dwellings are not "cable systems."
While under most circumstances the statutory distinction between closed
transmission paths and radio frequencies is justified by the underlying policy
regarding the use of public rights-of-way, this policy rationale appears to be
104. The 1984 Cable Act's definition of "cable system," as interpreted by the FCC,
distinguishes between systems using wires to connect commonly owned, controlled or managed
buildings and those connecting separately owned, controlled or managed buildings even though
neither type of system crosses public rights-of-way. In a recent case, the Court of Appeals for
the district of Columbia held that the FCC's interpretation of the definition of "cable system"
in the 1984 Cable Act would violate SMATV's equal protection rights absent a rational basis
for such a distinction. Beach Communications v. FCC, No. 91-1089, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS
3511 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 6, 1992).
105. 56 Fed. Reg. 1931 (1991). Likewise, SMATV systems that use closed transmission
paths only within the premises of a multiple unit dwelling are not "cable systems." Id.
106. 56 Fed. Reg. 1931 (1991). See 47 U.S.C. § 522(6) (1988) ("the term 'cable system'
means a facility consisting of a set of closed transmission paths... but such term does not
include ... a facility that serves only subscribers in 1 or more multiple unit dwellings under
common ownership, control, or management, unless such facility or facilities uses any public
right of way, .. ")
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absent in the case of connecting separately owned adjacent dwellings.
Recently, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held in
Beach Communications, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission"°7
that absent a rational basis set forth by the FCC this distinction between
systems serving commonly owned and separately owned buildings would
violate the equal protection clause of the Fifth Amendment. While the court
found itself "unable to imagine any basis for the distinction,"10 it remand-
ed the case directing the FCC to address this particular issue.
3. Home Satellite Dish Industry"°
Today, roughly two to three million homes own satellite dishes."'
These dishes usually access C-band satellite transponders, and in some cases
access Ku-band transponders.111 Through their satellite home dishes,
viewers receive programming similar to that available via coaxial cable.112
In some areas viewers can receive over 100 channels via satellite.113
Backyard dishes are particularly appealing in rural areas which are not
reached by coaxial cable systems.
One regulatory burden the satellite industry has historically faced is local
zoning restrictions. Some localities have used their zoning laws to discrimi-
nate against satellite receiving antennas by treating them differently from
other receiving antennas. 4 In response to this problem, the FCC promul-
gated rules in 1986 which preempted local zoning ordinances which
discriminate against satellite receiving antennas. According to this rule, state
and local regulations can differentiate between home satellite dish (TVRO)
systems and other antennas only if they have a "reasonable and clearly
107. Beach Communications, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 3511.
108. Id. at *41.
109. For background on the satellite industry, see H.R. Rep. No. 887, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5611, 5613-14; David Owen, Satellite Television,
ATLANTIC, June 1985, at 45.
110. S. Rep. No. 92, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 15 (1991).
111. Id. Satellite television operates by delivering land-based circuits to an uplink facility
which beams the program to a satellite. The satellite then transmits the signal back to earth on
either a C-band or Ku-band frequency. REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, CABLE AND
SATELUTE CARRIER COMPULSORY LICENSES: AN OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS app. D, at 3
(1992) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT OFFICE COMPULSORY LICENSE REPORT].
112. "Until the 1979 deregulation of earth stations, the home satellite industry was reduced
to the few who could comply with the Commission's licensing policies and had the room to
construct and maintain ten- to twenty-foot earth dishes. While today's dishes of three to five
feet in diameter are more commonplace--it is estimated that there are somewhat over two
million home dish users today-this is a relatively recent phenomenon." Daniel L. Brenner,
Was Cable Television a Monopoly?, 42 FED. COMM. L.J. 402 (1990).
113. JAMES C. GOODALE, ALL ABOUT CABLE, LEGAL AND BUSINESS ASPECTS OF CABLE AND
PAY TELEVISION § 5.09 (1991).
114. See Hearing on S. 12, Cable Television Consumer Protection Act, Before the Subcomm.
on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (statement of Charles C. Hewitt, President, Satellite Broadcasting and
Communications Ass'n) [hereinafter Hewitt Statement].
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defined health, safety or aesthetic objective" and "do not operate to impose
unreasonable limitations on, or prevent, reception of satellite delivered
signals by receive-only antennas, or to impose costs on the users of such
antennas that are excessive in light of the purchase and installation cost of
[the] equipment."' 15 The FCC took efforts to prohibit municipalities from
making a technology-based distinction absent a compelling underlying policy
justification. However, according to representatives of the satellite industry,
the FCC rule is not being adequately enforced and some municipalities
continue to discriminate against satellite receiving antennas. The satellite
industry maintains that "[t]hrough their zoning ordinances, building codes,
or sheer bureaucratic weight, the localities are flying in the face of the FCC's
preemption rules and preventing households from acquiring or using home
satellite dishes."" 6 To foster the full development of the satellite industry,
zoning ordinances must be enforced in the technology-neutral manner the
FCC intended.
4. DBS-Direct Broadcast Satellite
In the early 1980s, the FCC adopted the Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS)
service and licensed a number of providers. Compared to traditional satellite
systems, the DBS signal is higher powered. It can be received by dishes of
only one foot in diameter, which is much smaller than the larger satellite
dishes needed for C- and Ku-band reception." 7 Although there have been
high expectations for DBS since at least 1984,1 the technology has yet to
be launched. As this industry begins to emerge, however, which some
believe may be soon,"' issues regarding its regulatory treatment must be
dealt with in a technology-neutral manner.
B. Cross Ownership Restrictions
To create the most efficient telecommunications systems, operators
115. 51 Fed. Reg. 5519, 5526 (1986). The FCC's "objective [was] to ensure that satellite
receiving antennas are not treated less favorably than other antenna devices such as Amateur
Radio antennas and Satellite Master Antenna Systems (SMATVs)." Id. at 5523.
116. Hewitt Statement, supra note 114. As a means of combatting this problem, the satellite
industry urges Congress to "grant the FCC sufficient enforcement authority in this matter to act
against jurisdictions which willfully violate its preemption rule on TVRO's." Id.
117. S. Rep. No. 92, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1991).
118. For example, in enacting the 1984 Cable Act, Congress expressed its belief that the cable
industry would face increasing competition from DBS. See S. Rep. No. 67, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 20 (1983).
119. Id. For example, U.S. Satellite Broadcasting and Hughes Communications recently
announced a joint venture to create the "first high-power Ku-band, Direct Broadcast Satellite
service." Hearing on H.R. 1303, the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition
Act, and Competition in the Video Programming Marketplace Before the Subcomm. on
Telecommunications and Finance of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (statement of Chuck Hewitt, President, Satellite Broadcasting and
Communications Ass'n).
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should be allowed to draw from all of the available technologies. All the
current technologies are compatible and should be used together to create
efficient and internationally competitive hybrid telecommunications systems.
Government policies, however, inadvertently prevent the full, integrated
utilization of these technologies. The numerous ownership restrictions placed
on telecommunications technologies, for example, unintentionally impede the
development of efficient hybrid systems.
Historically, Congress and the FCC have enforced a number of
restrictions limiting the ownership of media systems. For example, in 1943,
the FCC adopted a rule prohibiting a party from owning more than one
broadcast station in a local market." In addition to such inter-industry
rules, restrictions have been placed on simultaneous ownership of both cable
and broadcast stations as well as cable and telco ownership. The FCC
imposes restrictions on cable involvement in wireless cable 2' and Congress
is currently considering placing restrictions on the cross-ownership of cable
and SMATV or MMDS systems." While these restrictions are well-
intentioned, cross-ownership bars may, in fact, erect artificial barriers
inhibiting the advancements of new technologies.
Under rules adopted by the FCC in 1970 and later codified by Congress
in the 1984 Cable Act, licensees of local broadcast television stations are
prohibited from owning a cable system within the station's predicted grade
B contour."z' In addition, FCC regulations prohibit cross-ownership
between cable systems and national television networks."
The 1984 Cable Act prohibits a telephone company from offering cable
television services in the same geographical area in which it provides
telephone services."z This restriction does not apply, however, to common
carriers providing service to rural areas" or to areas where the video
programming would not be provided "except through a cable system owned
by, operated by, controlled by, or affiliated with" the common carrier."
Cable systems are also restricted from operating wireless cable systems.
FCC regulations generally prohibit cable operators from acquiring MDS
120. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(a) (1991).
121. 47 C.F.R. § 21.912 (1991).
122. See, e.g., S. 12, § 9.
123. In re Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K, of the Commission's Rules and Regulations
Relative to Community Antenna Television Systems, 23 F.C.C.2d 816, 817, (1970) (Second
Report and Order); 47 U.S.C. § 533(a) (1988) ("It shall be unlawful for any person to be a
cable operator if such person directly, or through I or more affiliates, owns or controls the
license of a television broadcast station and the predicted grade B contour of such stations covers
any portion of the community served by such operator's cable system.").
124. 47 C.F.R. 76.501 (1991).
125. 47 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1988).
126. 47 U.S.C. § 533(b)(3) (1988). Presently, Congress is considering expanding the
definition of "rural areas" to include areas without an incorporated community of more than
10,000 residents, rather than the current 2,500 resident limit. See, e.g., S.12, § 24, 138 Cong.
Rec. S666 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1992).
127. 47 U.S.C. § 553(b)(4) (1988).
[Vol. 28252
1992] DEBALKANIZE THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKETPLACE 253
licenses or leasing MDS transmission time if the cable system's franchise
area encompasses a portion of the MDS stations' protected service area.1"
This prohibition does not apply, however, when there is a second cable
system in the first cable system's franchise area."
Presently, Congress is considering legislation which would create new
cross-ownership restrictions for wireless cable (MMDS) and SMATV.
Under this legislation, a cable operator would be prohibited from owning an
MMDS or SMATV system in the same areas in which it holds a franchise
for a cable system."3 The FCC could waive this requirement, if neces-
sary, to ensure that residents in the cable community receive video program-
ming.131 In addition, under this legislation, if ten percent of the nation's
households with television sets subscribe to multichannel programming
services provided via satellite, the FCC would be required to promulgate
regulations limiting ownership of such direct-to-home satellite services by
cable operators and other persons having media interests, and requiring
access to such service by unaffiliated programmers."
There appears to be a growing belief, particularly at the FCC, that cross-
ownership restrictions should be eased to promote growth in the telecommu-
nications marketplace. For example, the FCC has proposed eliminating
certain restrictions on network-cable cross-ownership.133 This rule was
initially adopted in 1970 in response to the concern that the "networks, if
permitted to own cable systems at this critical stage of their development,
could potentially thwart the industry's growth and inhibit competition. "1
3
Today, given the cable industry's tremendous growth and the broadcast
industry's relative decline, the FCC asserts that this concern may no longer
carry the weight necessary to justify the cross-ownership restriction. 135 As
discussed above," the FCC has also proposed easing telco-cable cross-
ownership restrictions by permitting local telephone companies to provide
video dial tone.
Such efforts to ease cross-ownership restrictions may be needed to
promote an efficient and competitive use of technology. While intended to
promote diversity of programming, cross-ownership restrictions inhibit
technological advancements in telecommunications. Again, lawmakers must
look beyond such clear-cut technological distinctions as cross-ownership
restrictions. Their policy objectives may be better served by other regulatory
128. 47 C.F.R. § 21.912.
129. Id.
130. S. 12, § 9.
131. S. 12, § 9(B).
132. Id.
133. 57 Fed. Reg. 6792 (1992) (FCC proposal to eliminate the rule contained in 47 CFR §
76.501(a)(1) (1991)).
134. 57 Fed. Reg. 868 (1992).
135. See id.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 59-64.
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measures. For example, if a purpose of cross-ownership restrictions is to
prevent a party from buying up rights to the use of a technology to
"warehouse" it to assure that its competition does not use it, it is possible to
permit cross-ownership so long as the technologies are used and the resulting
combination does not impede competition. It should not be possible to
acquire SMATV and wireless cable licenses and warehouse them to prevent
competition in their markets.137 In addition, safeguards can be adopted to
prevent cross-subsidization without barring entry into the market. For
example, telephone consumers should be protected from indirectly paying for
telephone company entry into the cable arena. By eliminating cross-
ownership restrictions and replacing them with more technology-neutral
safeguards, lawmakers can help achieve both media diversity and efficient
technological utilization.
Allowing various technologies to be used together will lead to more
efficient and internationally competitive hybrid telecommunications systems.
Today, no alternative technology has yet been fully utilized, or has yet met
its potential as a competitor or adjunct of coaxial cable delivery systems.
For these technologies to have the chance to compete, existing laws must be
interpreted and enforced, when possible, in a technology-neutral manner. In
addition, new laws must be enacted to place all delivery systems on a more
level playing field.
IV. THE NEED FOR TECHNOLOGY-NEUTRAL POLICY
Existing laws and policies should, to the extent possible, be technology-
neutral. The ongoing debate over the scope of the cable "compulsory
license" and its availability to providers of wireless cable and home satellite
provides a useful illustration. This conflict shows the irrationality of
distinguishing among technologies and applying different rules to different
businesses depending on the nature of the hardware they employ to deliver
signals to consumers.
A. Technology-Specific Copyright Policy
Cable owes much of its unparalleled growth today to the early benefits
it received from the compulsory license. Initially, this preference was
intended to assist the infant cable industry by guaranteeing it access to
necessary programming and by freeing it from the burden of negotiating
licenses on a program-by-program basis. Today, noncable technologies need
to be assured the same benefits of the compulsory license.
137. One purpose behind proposed cross-ownership restrictions on cable and wireless cable
or SMATV systems is to "prevent cable from warehousing its potential competition." S. Rep.
No. 92, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1991).
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Prior to enactment of the Copyrights Act of 1976,13' cable did not have
to pay copyright royalties, because the Supreme Court had found that retrans-
mission of television signals by cable systems did not constitute "perfor-
mance" under the Copyrights Act of 1909.139 In 1976, Congress revised
the Copyrights Act to hold that "cable retransmission is a public performance
and therefore subject to full copyright liability."" 4 Because it believed that
it would be "impractical and unduly burdensome to require every cable
system to negotiate with every copyright owner whose work was retransmit-
ted by a cable system,"14' Congress created a compulsory license system
by which cable systems would meet their copyright obligations. Under this
compulsory licensing scheme, cable systems must pay semi-annual fees to the
Register of Copyrights in return for a license to retransmit television signals
containing copyrighted programs. These fees are then distributed to
copyright owners. In general, the compulsory license only applies to distant
non-network programming. 142
In section 111, the Copyrights Act of 1976 authorizes a compulsory
license for "cable systems," which are defined as systems making secondary
transmissions "by wires, cable, or other communications channels." 43
While the definition of "cable system" is broad enough to cover technologies
other than coaxial cable, including wireless cable (MMDS), SMATV, and
138. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914
(1988)).
139. See Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 415 U.S. 394 (1974);
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
140. Fred H. Cate, Cable Television and the Compulsory Copyright License, 42 FED. COMM.
L.J. 191, 202 (1990). See 17 U.S.C. § 111(b) (1976). ("Notwithstanding the provisions of
subsections (a) and (c), the secondary transmission to the public of a primary transmission
embodying a performance or display of a work is actionable as an act of infringement under
section 501, and is fully subject to the remedies provided by sections 502 through 506 and
509 ...- )
141. H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 89 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5704.
142. Cable systems may generally carry local signals for free. However, those systems
carrying nothing but local signals are "required to submit a statement of account and pay a basic
minimum royalty fee." COPYRIGHT OFFICE COMPULSORY LICENSE REPORT, supra note 111,
at 28 n.26. Section lII's different treatment of local and distance signals is premised on a
policy distinction between the impact of local and distant signals on the value of copyrighted
works being broadcast. The carriage of local broadcast signals was seen as not impacting the
value of the works because the signals were already available for free to the same viewers. The
carriage of distant signals, on the other hand, was viewed as impacting the value since local
broadcasters who compensate broadcasters would not be willing to pay more for programming
reaching distant markets where viewers would not be likely to buy their goods. See id. at 28.
143. 17 U.S.C. § 111(0 (1988). The term "cable system" is fully defined as:
a facility, located in any State, Territory, Trust Territory, or Possession that in whole
or in part receives signals transmitted by one or more television broadcast stations
licensed by the Federal Communications Commission, and makes secondary
transmissions of such signals or programs by wires, cables, or other communications
channels to subscribing members of the public who pay for such service.
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satellite systems, as well as future technologies, the Copyright Office has
refused to interpret "cable system" in the broad manner that Congress
intended. 1" Instead, the Copyright Office has interpreted section 111 in
a more technology-specific manner.
In a 1991 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM)," the Copyright
Office tentatively concluded that satellite carriers and wireless cable systems
are not eligible for the compulsory license but that some SMATV systems
are "cable systems" and thus are entitled to the compulsory license under
certain conditions. Subsequently, in January 1992, the Copyright Office
issued a final rule denying wireless cable and satellite carriers the compulso-
ry license. 1"
First, the Copyright Office found that satellite carriers are not "cable
systems" under section 111(f) of the Copyrights Act. "47 In reaching this
conclusion, the Copyright Office noted that the "facilities of a satellite
carrier, specifically the facilities which make the secondary transmissions, are
not located in any state," which is a "critical requirement in the definition"
of a "cable system."' 48
The Copyright Office went on to hold that wireless cable systems are not
"cable systems" under the Copyrights Act. The Copyright Office asserted
that because wireless cable systems "do not make secondary transmissions
to subscribers via closed path transmissions," they are not "cable systems"
under section 11 (f).149
Remarkably, the Copyright Office also tentatively held in its NPRM that
"SMATV operations, under certain conditions, may satisfy the requirements
to be considered cable systems."" The Copyright Office conditioned
SMATV's eligibility for the compulsory license on its compliance with newly
proposed regulations.' Such regulations, according to the Copyright
Office, are designed to address the "unique problems for calculating royalty
fees and filing statements of account pursuant to 37 CFR 201.17 152
associated with SMATV. This would ensure that only SMATV systems that
meet the requirements for a "cable system" will enjoy the compulsory
license. The Copyright Office listed a number of reasons for its conclusion
144. See 57 Fed. Reg. 3284 (1992).
145. 56 Fed. Reg. 31,580 (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201) (proposed July 11, 1991)
[hereinafter NPRM].
146. 57 Fed. Reg. 3284 (1992) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201) [hereinafter Rule]. The
Copyright Office did not issue a final rule regarding SMATV's eligibility for the compulsory
license. See Rule at 3290.
147. See id. at 3290-92.
148. Rule, supra note 146, at 3290.
149. NPRM, supra note 145, at 31,593.
150. Id.
151. See id. at 31,594.
152. Id.
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regarding SMATV,5 including the assertion that SMATV uses "cable and
wire primarily to deliver broadcast signals.""M
By asserting that "the phrase 'or other communications channels' should
not be read to encompass video delivery systems that do not primarily
retransmit broadcast signals via physically closed transmission paths such as
cable or wires, ""' 5 the Copyright Office ignored both the statutory text and
Congress' intent in creating the compulsory license system. The continued
availability of the compulsory license to wireless cable, SMATV, and
satellite systems is compelled by the plain language of Section 111, the
legislative history of the Copyrights Act, judicial interpretations of the phrase
"wires, cables, or other communications channels," and a decision by the
Eleventh Circuit holding that a system utilizing no closed transmission paths
at all is a "cable system" for purposes of Section 111.11
The plain language of the Copyrights Act shows that Congress did not
intend to condition eligibility for the compulsory licensing program on the
type of "communications channels" used. Rather, the Act permits a system
to avail itself of the compulsory license so long as it makes secondary
transmissions "by wires, cables, or other communications channels."'57
Section 11 (f), which Congress cast in such broad terms, should not be read
to exclude wireless cable or satellite systems simply because they utilize
transmission technologies present but not fully developed at the time that the
Act was enacted.158
The "or" in the phrase "wires, cables, or other communications
channels" should be given its normal disjunctive meaning. In denying that
wireless cable systems make secondary transmissions by "wires, cables, or
other communications channels" because wireless does not "primarily" rely
on closed transmission paths,'59 the Copyright Office has ignored the plain
meaning of the word "or" in the phrase "or other communications channels."
Moreover, definitive judicial interpretations suggest that the phrase
"wires, cables, or other communications channels," as used earlier in Section
I 11 (a) of the Copyrights Act, includes wireless cable, SMATV, and satellite
systems. Section 111(a)(3) establishes an exemption from the statutory
licensing scheme for common carriers that provide passive retransmission
services to third parties via "wires, cables, or other communications
channels." As the Eleventh Circuit noted in National Broadcasting Company
153. See id. at 31,593-94.
154. Id. at 31,594.
155. Id. at 31,593.
156. Satellite Broadcast Networks, 940 F.2d 1467.
157. 17 U.S.C. § 111(f) (1988) (emphasis added).
158. Although the Copyright Office concedes that Congress did not intend "to restrict the
compulsory license solely to the cable system technology of 1976" and recognizes judicial
findings that "Congress did not intend to freeze the compulsory license in a way that would
discourage technological development and implementation," its decision leads to just such
restrictions. See NPRM, supra note 145, at 31,594.
159. Id. at 31,593.
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v. Satellite Broadcast Networks,1 ° the judiciary (including the United
States Courts of Appeal for the Second"' and Eighth Circuits 62) has
given the phrase "or other communications channels" its normal meaning and
ruled that carriers who rely almost exclusively on satellite and terrestrial
microwave channels to make secondary transmissions are eligible for the
exemption because they use "wires, cables, or other communications
channels." Therefore, since microwave and satellite carriers are deemed to
utilize "wires, cables, or other communications channels" for purposes of
subsection (a), wireless cable, SMATV and satellite systems must be
considered to use "wires, cables, or other communications channels" for
purposes of subsection (f). There is no indication that Congress intended this
phrase to be defined differently depending on whether it was in subsection
(a) or subsection (f).
The legislative history of the Copyrights Act further indicates Congress'
desire to anticipate technological changes. The goal behind the compulsory
licensing scheme, as with other copyright policies, is to promote "broad
public availability of literature, music, and the other arts. " "a Clearly,
diversity in programming will be promoted if a wider range of technologies
are able to deliver video programming.
As an example of Congress' intent, the definition of the term "transmit"
in section 106 of the Copyrights Act "is broad enough to include all
conceivable forms and combinations of wired or wireless communications
media, including but by no means limited to radio and television broadcasting
as we know them."" 6 Congress included broad and flexible language in
its 1976 Amendment to the Copyrights Act to take account of technological
changes and to ensure that eligibility for the compulsory license is based on
equivalency of function among delivery systems rather than on particular
technological attributes of individual systems.
The Eleventh Circuit has confirmed that Congress intended the
compulsory license provision to be technology-neutral. In Satellite
Broadcast, the court found that "[tihe legislative history shows that in
considering the Copyrights Act, Congress understood that the development
160. Satellite Broadcast, 940 F.2d 1467.
161. Eastern Microwave v. Doubleday Sports, 691 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1982).
162. Hubbard Broadcasting v. Southern Satellite Systems, 777 F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1005 (1986).
163. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). Cf Hubbard
Broadcasting, 777 F.2d at 400, (rejecting interpretation of § 11 which, "if accepted, would
largely freeze for Section 111 purposes both technological development and implementation ...
[and] would force both primary and secondary transmitters alike to forego available,
economically feasible technology. We reject this stand still status quo oriented view of the
compulsory licensing provisions."); Eastern Microwave, 691 F.2d at 132 ("Interpretation of the
[Copyright] Act must occur in the real world of telecommunications, not in a vacuum").
164. H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 63 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5678.
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of satellites promised a new channel for communicating in the future.""
The same legislative history provides ample evidence that Congress
anticipated that the phrase "or other communications channels" would
accommodate developing terrestrially-based microwave technologies. As the
court noted, "[tihe legislative history supports our conclusion that Congress
intended to paint with a broad brush."1"
When defining the term "cable system" in 1976 for purposes of the
compulsory license, Congress rejected the FCC's then-current definition-a
definition that limited the phrase to systems using closed transmission paths.
Instead, Congress favored a more expansive definition by adding the phrase
"or other communications channels" to Section 111(f). Congress had a
purpose for adding that phrase, and, as the court implied in Satellite
Broadcast, the purpose appears to have been to make the cable system
definition technology-neutral.
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Satellite Broadcast removed any
possible rationale for the Copyright Office's conclusion that satellite carriers
and wireless cable systems are not entitled to the compulsory license. In
Satellite Broadcast, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that a company which engaged
in the secondary transmission of a broadcast signal via satellite is a "cable
system" for purposes of Section 111(f) despite the fact that it did not
primarily employ closed transmission paths.1 7 Satellite Broadcast thus
reversed an earlier district court decision, Pacific & Southern Co. v. Satellite
Broadcast Networks," s which held that the Satellite Broadcast Network did
not constitute a "cable system" under section 111(f) of the Copyrights Act.
Although acknowledging the Copyright Office's NPRM, the court nonethe-
less found that a system that primarily employs wireless transmission paths
is a "cable system" because microwave channels emanating from a satellite
are "other communications channels." Indeed, in addressing the NPRM, the
Court of Appeals specifically stated that "we have considered the views of
the Copyright Office on the language and legislative history of section 111,
but we find those views unpersuasive." 1'
For purposes of section 111 (f), a wireless cable system is indistinguish-
able from the satellite system considered by the Court of Appeals. Just as
the system at issue in Satellite Broadcast utilizes microwave to transmit
broadcast programming from a central site to subscribers, so too does a
wireless cable system employ microwave. And, just as the microwave
transmissions in Satellite Broadcast were deemed by the Court of Appeals to
satisfy the "wires, cables, or other communications channels" requirement,
so too must the microwave transmissions by wireless cable operators be
165. Satellite Broadcast, 940 F.2d at 1470 n.3.
166. Satellite Broadcast, 940 F.2d at 1470 n.5.
167. See id. at 1469 n.3.
168. Pacific & Southern Co., 694 F. Supp. 1565.
169. Satellite Broadcast, 940 F.2d at 1470 n.4.
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deemed to satisfy the test.
The Copyright Office's technology-specific interpretation of section 111
to exclude satellite carriers and wireless cable from the broad definition of
"cable system" is not well reasoned. Demonstrating the Office's irrational
decision, the Copyright Office would even choose not to extend the
compulsory license to any telephone company should the telcos be let into the
video marketplace. The Copyright Office has stated that it would not offer
telcos the compulsory license"7 even though such eligibility seems com-
pelled by the Copyright Office's reasoning requiring video delivery systems
that "primarily retransmit broadcast signals via physically closed transmission
paths such as cable or wires."17' Because telephone companies would
ostensibly meet all of the requirements for a "cable system," the Copyright
Office's statements that it would nonetheless deny telcos the compulsory
license further underscores the irrationality of the Copyright Office's
technology-specific interpretation.
The Copyright Office's final decision serves as an example of how even
when Congress drafts legislation intended to accommodate emerging
technologies,"n these technologies run into arbitrary barriers enforced by
government agencies interpreting and enforcing these policies. To provide
an environment in which all subscription television technologies can compete,
these government entities should avoid narrow interpretations of telecommu-
nications statutes.
B. Technology-Specific Legislation: The Satellite
Home Viewers Act of 1988
Similarly, Congress must be careful to avoid, when possible, enacting
industry-specific legislation. Such legislation creates unnecessary inequalities
which hinder the development of some technologies and forces Congress to
go through the cumbersome legislative process each time an additional
industry raises a valid concern. Instead, in enacting telecommunications
laws, Congress should focus on underlying policy objectives rather than the
technological means by which it reaches this end.
170. COPYRIGHT OFFICE COMPULSORY LICENSE REPORT, supra note 111, at xi ("Direct
broadcast satellite services and the telephone companies are forecast to be providing video
services to subscribers in the near future and they too will be without the protection of the cable
license.").
171. NPRM, supra note 145, at 31,593.
172. In response to the Copyright Office's role, Congress has introduced legislation to clarify
Congress' original compulsory license. This legislation would amend the definition of a "cable
system" in § 111 to include "microwave, or any other technologies employed for the local
distribution of secondary transmissions of broadcast programming." H.R. 4451, 102d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1992). In amending this definition, the bill would ensure that wireless cable and other
alternative video transmission technologies would be eligible for the compulsory license.
Recognizing that its decision to deny wireless cable the compulsory license was controversial,
the Copyright Office delayed the effective date of its decision until January 1, 1994, so that
Congress could adopt just this type of legislation. See 57 Fed. Reg. 3284 (1992).
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The Satellite Home Viewers Act of 198811 is an industry-specific law.
Partly in response to the District Court's decision in Pacific & Southern,74
Congress enacted the Satellite Home Viewers Act of 1988 to provide satellite
carriers with protection similar to that they would have received had the
compulsory license provision been interpreted to apply to them. This Act
created an interim statutory license in the Copyrights Act for satellite carriers
to retransmit television broadcast signals of superstations and network
stations to earth station owners for private home viewing. 175
As stated in the House Report accompanying the Satellite Home Viewers
Act, Congress designed this Act to allow "an exciting new communications
technology-satellite earth stations-. . . to develop and flourish." 176
Unfortunately, as necessary and well-advised as this measure may have been
to protect just the satellite industry, the approach Congress took may have
weakened the position of other emerging technologies. Instead of singling
out the satellite industry, Congress could have pointed to the broad language
in section 111(f) of the Copyrights Act of 1976 as an illustration of
Congress' original intent to provide alternative technologies, including the
satellite industry, wireless cable, SMATV, etc., with the benefits of the
compulsory license. By choosing to address the satellite industry's concerns
through industry-specific legislation, Congress has made it unnecessarily
difficult on other technologies to argue for their entitlement to the compulso-
ry license under section 111 (f). Once again, Congress' good intentions were
mistakenly masked in an ultimately unintentionally harmful technology-
specific statute.
CONCLUSION
As the debates surrounding telco entry, cross-ownership restrictions, the
compulsory license, and a variety of other telecommunications issues
illustrate, today's telecommunications law consists of a hodgepodge of rules
in which incidental distinctions among various technologies have impaired the
growth and competitiveness of the U.S. telecommunications marketplace.
However, since these regulatory distinctions are largely historical accidents
and are not the most appropriate means to achieve any identifiable policy
objective, there often is no compelling reason to preserve them. In the
development of the telecommunications market, there has been a consistent
pattern of under-utilization of new technologies, with development slowed not
by a lack of commercial viability, but by regulatory impediments. This is
not to suggest that policymakers should follow the path of deregulation taken
173. Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935, 3949 (Title II codified as amended in scattered
sections of 17 U.S.C.).
174. Pacific & Southern, 694 F. Supp. 1565.
175. H.R. Rep. No. 887(I), 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5611, 5618.
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in the banking, airlines, or trucking industries. Rather, Congress and
regulators should pursue policy goals through technology-neutral laws and
rules designed to promote growth, innovation, and delivery to consumers of
the full benefits of new technologies in the telecommunications marketplace.
Congress, regulators, and industry leaders should encourage efforts to
develop technology-neutral policies and resist the urge to deal with policy
questions on an ad hoc, technology-specific basis. Of course, in some
situations there may be overriding objective policy justifications for
distinguishing among individual technologies. Even then, however, certain
questions should be asked before drawing these lines. For example,
lawmakers should ask if distinguishing particular technologies is necessary
to reach their policy objectives and if this distinction is likely to advance or
hinder competition. Moreover, technology-specific exceptions to generally
neutral policies must be crafted as narrowly as possible, which may entail
adding sunset clauses to these provisions. Only by freeing the telecommuni-
cations marketplace from unnecessary technology-specific legal barriers will
all U.S. telecommunications industries realize their full potential.
